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A state of emergency: how local 
businesses experienced the 2012 
flood in Fiji
Karen E McNamara, The University of Queensland, examines how local 
authorities in Fiji might better respond in emergencies to ensure the socio-
economic wellbeing of the local community is protected.
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ABSTRACT
In late March 2012, severe flash-flooding 
caused loss of life and widespread 
damage to property, businesses and 
community infrastructure in and around 
Fiji’s international tourism destination, 
Nadi. With little warning, local businesses 
had limited or no time to prepare for 
inundation once the banks of the Nadi 
River broke. Drawing on the experiences 
of local businesses in Nadi, the major 
causes of extensive financial loss were 
high recovery costs, limited insurance of 
property and goods, and contracted levels 
of government assistance to help them 
prepare and recover. This was a serious 
concern for the long-term sustainability 
of local businesses in the area. Lessons on 
how local authorities might better respond 
in the future are proposed, which include 
more effective early warning systems and 
strengthened disaster preparation and 
recovery systems to ensure that the socio-
economic wellbeing of the local community 
is protected in the long-term.  
Background and study objective
The flood in late March 2012, which affected Nadi 
and surrounding areas, was touted by the media and 
Fiji government officials as the worst flooding event 
experienced by Fiji in decades. Record high rainfall 
in March, caused by Tropical Depression TD17F, fell 
onto an already saturated catchment due to a previous 
flooding event in January the same year. This torrential 
rainfall fell over Fiji’s Western Division, which makes 
up the economic backbone of the country due to the 
location of core industries such as sugar, gold mining 
and tourism. Devastation was experienced throughout 
the area, including the Division capital, Lautoka. 
However, Nadi, a hub for commerce and tourism, 
experienced some of the most severe and sustained 
damage as a result of the meandering Nadi River 
that defines the downtown area. The river meanders 
through the main commercial centre of Nadi Town, 
which contains numerous shops, businesses and 
homes. The entire Nadi River basin, traversing an area 
of 517km², is very important to Fiji as it supports the 
livelihoods of around 65 000 people (IUCN 2011). As 
a consequence of this flash-flooding, the Nadi River 
broke its banks early in the morning on 30 March 2012 
and the town was inundated by peak floodwaters of six 
metres above mean levels. 
Nadi and surrounding areas are located on a 
floodplain, and, as such, community infrastructure 
and settlements are located in low-lying areas that 
are bound by the Nadi River. Flooding and inundation 
events are not new to the residents and business 
owners in this area, but the flooding event in late 
March 2012 brought with it an unprecedented level 
of devastation, loss and concern about the future 
sustainability of this area as an urban centre and a 
major tourism destination. 
With little warning provided to residents and shop 
owners to move their goods and livelihood assets to 
higher ground, the result was a staggering financial 
loss that burdened the large proportion of locals 
in the affected areas. A correspondent for a Fijian 
magazine, Tafazul Gani, lamented at the time of the 
flood: ‘Basically, if you look at the town, the town is 
totally decimated. It actually looks like a warzone. 
There is not a single shop in the town which has not 
been affected’ (Kerin 2012). Four people were killed 
by the flood, which also temporarily displaced 15 000 
people who sought assistance, food and shelter in 
evacuation centres. There was widespread ‘damages 
to infrastructure, schools, homes, businesses and 
agriculture’ (UN Resident Coordinator 2012, p. 1). 
Consequently, government authorities declared a state 
of emergency on 1 April 2012 (AFP 2012).
For the first time in history, the Nadi International 
Airport, which serves approximately 1.2 million 
passengers a year, was closed to inbound passengers 
for four days with a contracted number of outbound 
flights permitted during this time. The reason for the 
closure was the severity of the flooding and the inability 
of people to travel to hotels and homes once in Nadi. 
This added drain of more people in the disaster area 
would put pressure on already scarce resources such 
as food and freshwater. 
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The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNISDR) defines disaster risk reduction 
as ‘the systematic development and application 
of policies, strategies and practices to minimise 
vulnerabilities, hazards and the unfolding of disaster 
impacts throughout a society, in the broad context 
of sustainable development’ (UNISDR 2004, p. 3). 
While this definition is broad in scope it makes a very 
poignant point; that sustainable development should 
be the core focus in planning for and recovering 
from disasters. 
Disasters hinder development. Moreover, development 
itself can be the root cause of a disaster, and 
development processes and challenges, such as 
poverty and limited livelihood resources, can severely 
influence the extent of damage caused by disasters 
(see Kelman & Gaillard 2008). Disaster risk reduction 
and management is multi-disciplinary in that it needs 
to consider the broader political, socio-economic and 
environmental conditions in which a disaster unfolds 
(see Gaillard, Liamzon & Villanueva 2007; Wisner et 
al. 2004). As such, this study was driven by one core 
objective—to explore how local businesses in Nadi 
experienced this disaster, drawing on the political, 
socio-economic and environmental conditions in which 
the flooding occurred. In understanding the coping 
responses of shop owners, managers and employees, 
we can begin to understand how such a severe and 
damaging event might be better prepared for and 
managed in the future.
Methodology
The findings of this study are drawn from 34 surveys 
completed in November 2012 with local businesses 
in Nadi. These surveys, containing a mix of closed 
and open-ended questions, used the same set and 
order of questions to allow for analyses using the 
statistics program SPSS (version 16.0, see Neuman 
2006). The survey enquired about the particular socio-
economic characteristics of the business such as type 
of business, number of employees, and annual profit. 
The survey captured details on the preparedness and 
response of individual businesses to the flood in March 
2012. For instance, questions probed respondents 
on the amount of time they had to move shop 
merchandise to higher ground and evacuate, along with 
the estimated cost of the flood damage. The survey 
concluded with a series of open-ended questions along 
with a number of quantitative attitudinal questions 
(using a Likert scale) that explored respondents’ levels 
of concern about the incidence of disasters in their 
community, their preparedness for such disasters 
through the creation of disaster management plans, 
and evacuation plans for their businesses. 
Starting at the northern end of Nadi’s main street 
(Queens Road), 50 local businesses were approached 
by the author to participate in this study. On most 
occasions, survey participants could complete the 
survey straight away. For others, the survey was left 
to be completed and the author returned over the next 
two days to collect the completed survey. All surveys 
were self-administered. Businesses in the last block 
of the main street (at the southern end near the Hindu 
Temple) were not surveyed as this area has a higher 
elevation than the northern end and did not suffer 
major damage. In total, 34 businesses (a response 
rate of 68 per cent) agreed to participate in the study. 
For the remaining 16 businesses, limited access 
to staff and other time pressures prevented their 
participation. Surveys were provided in English, Fijian 
and Hindi. Nearly all respondents requested the survey 
in English (except for one who requested the survey 
in Fijian), which is indicative of the language spoken 
most widely at work, and which caters predominately to 
international tourists. 
Damage to a business in Nadi, 10 days after the flood.
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Location and study sample
Fiji is a well-known Pacific Island country with a 
population of around 850 000. Fiji is a Melanesian 
country and encompasses over 300 islands which were 
formed through volcanic activity over 150 million years 
ago. Fiji generates its main sources of foreign exchange 
from a strong tourism industry and large sugar 
exports. Nadi is the main entry point for international 
tourists, due to the location of the international airport 
and gateway to the nearby Port Denarau, Mamanuca 
and Yasawa group of islands. Figure 1 illustrates the 
location of Fiji and Nadi, which is positioned on the 
west coast of the main island, Viti Levu. The majority of 
survey respondents were shop employees (44 per cent 
of the sample), followed by shop managers 
(29 per cent) and shop owners (27 per cent). More 
males completed the survey (65 per cent) than females 
(35 per cent).  
Businesses had an average of 13 full-time employees 
across all the 34 businesses. A range of different 
Figure 1 Location of Fiji and Nadi (Source: www.worldatlas.com).
©GraphicMaps.com ©GraphicMaps.com
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rate of 68 per cent) agreed to participate in the study. 
For the remaining 16 businesses, limited access 
to staff and other time pressures prevented their 
participation. Surveys were provided in English, Fijian 
and Hindi. Nearly all respondents requested the survey 
in English (except for one who requested the survey 
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most widely at work, and which caters predominately to 
international tourists. 
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Figure 1 Location of Fiji and Nadi (Source: www.worldatlas.com).
©GraphicMaps.com ©GraphicMaps.com
businesses were surveyed, however, most of these 
service the large international tourism market, such as 
clothing, jewellery and handicraft stores. Larger 
businesses, such as department stores, supermarkets 
and a car dealership were included in the sample. A 
large proportion of respondents indicated an annual 
profit of less than F$100 000 (approximately 
AU$52 000; 78 per cent), followed by those businesses 
with an annual profit of F$100 000–F$499 999 
(13 per cent) or more than F$500 000 (9 per cent).
Results: experiences of the flood
Local businesses in Nadi were surveyed six months 
after the devastating flood impacted on the town 
and surrounding areas. According to 77 per cent of 
respondents, they were not warned of the impending 
flood by local authorities. As lamented by one male 
shop owner:
‘They could have given us warning early in the morning 
when the river was going to flood. No sirens, nothing. 
We woke under flood, too late to come in the shop. One 
hundred percent damage. It was a big disaster. I live in 
fear’ (survey #2). 
This was the overriding sentiment put forward by 
respondents; that government failed to provide any 
warning to the local business community so they could 
prepare. The bulk of the warnings came late in the 
evening, which meant that many people missed them. 
Waking to the news that the Nadi River had broken 
its banks overnight and flooding was widespread 
throughout Nadi Town shocked and angered many in 
the business community who were unable to move 
their shop merchandise to higher ground and secure 
their premises.
Despite such views, the government did provide 
warnings of severe weather conditions to the local 
community, predominately through radio broadcasts. 
However, these warnings either came too late for 
businesses to adequately prepare or were not pitched 
at the correct warning level. As a result, the remaining 
respondents (23 per cent) indicated that the warning 
provided by the government was inadequate. One male 
shop owner explained the reasoning behind this: ‘Not 
much flood warning was given only through radio that low 
lying areas can get flooded’ (survey #8).
The information provided in government warnings—
that only some low-lying areas could be flooded—
caused complacency for a number of businesses in 
Nadi. A female shop manager explained that there was 
a warning but it failed to provide enough detail about 
areas and streets at threat from flooding: ‘Through the 
radio there was a flood warning for lower areas but I didn’t 
expect it in our shop’ (survey #11).
The extent to which the flooding occurred in Nadi was 
not expected and this was largely a function of the 
limited information provided in the warnings to local 
businesses and the community at large. Overall, the 34 
businesses surveyed indicated that the local authorities 
could have done more to help them prepare for the 
flood. The need for a more effective warning system 
was a common theme from respondents which is 
exemplified by a statement by a female shop owner: 
‘They should have one effective networking system where 
they can advise us about the flood’ (survey #22). This was 
one strategy put forward to mitigate the threat of flood; 
others included the need to improve flood forecasting 
and create more co-ordinated disaster preparedness.
A series of six attitudinal statements were also 
provided to respondents to ascertain the level of 
agreement based again on a Likert scale of 0 (‘do 
not agree’) to 4 (‘strongly agree’). Responses clearly 
indicated that government has a responsibility to 
prepare local communities and businesses for natural 
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disasters in the future (flood, droughts, cyclones, 
mean=3.3 and climate change, mean=3.3). One female 
shop employee argued: ‘Local authorities have the 
responsibility to provide information in advance so that the 
people of Fiji could prepare themselves for the disaster’ 
(survey #32).
The root of local business owner anguish towards 
government authorities on the lack of adequate 
warning was two-fold: warnings were not heard by 
many people as they were broadcast late in the evening 
and it was too late for many businesses to prepare, 
and warnings appeared to downplay the severity of 
the impending disaster and business owners did not 
rush to secure their shops and merchandise. While 
authorities may not have done an effective job of 
warning local businesses of the impending flooding in 
Nadi’s main commercial precinct, there also appeared 
to be little responsibility taken by the business 
owners themselves. The history of flooding in Nadi 
and its identification as a flood-risk town should have 
been enough to prompt business owners to adopt a 
precautionary approach once torrential rain started. 
This may have avoided such a substantial financial 
and psycho-social burden that an event such as 
this causes.
According to survey respondents, the estimated cost 
of the flood damage for individual businesses ranged 
from F$1 000 to F$1 million with a mean damage bill 
of F$129 000. Based on the annual profits indicated 
by these local businesses, the damage bill averaged 
out to cost them their annual profit. Not only was the 
cost of recovery high, a large proportion of surveyed 
local businesses (85 per cent) believed that the local 
authorities could have done more to help businesses 
in Nadi recover from this flood. While this finding is 
concerning, it is not surprising. Lessons that emerge 
from most disaster situations across the globe speak 
to the need for greater support and assistance from 
authorities, regardless of the country or level of 
socio-economic development. For instance, one of the 
most highly-criticised disaster emergency responses 
occurred in the United States when the government 
was publically accused of mismanaging both the 
preparations for and relief response to Hurricane 
Katrina—a category 5 hurricane which made landfall 
over southern Florida in August 2005, causing close 
to 2 000 deaths and inundating 80 per cent of New 
Orleans as a result of a failed levee system (Masquelier 
2006). In the case of Nadi, local businesses levied 
their criticisms of the inaction of authorities because 
little help was provided to shop owners to clean their 
shops and move damaged stock elsewhere. In previous 
flooding events (for example, January 2009), the Fiji 
Government provided local businesses with army 
personnel who helped with the clean-up, particularly 
the removal of mud, silt and damaged stock. This 
support was not on the same scale for the 2012 flood. 
Much of the relief and recovery efforts were pitched 
at local communities rather than businesses, with an 
acute focus on the following thematic cluster areas: 
• health and nutrition
• water, sanitation and hygiene
• education
• emergency shelter, and 
• food security and agriculture (UN Resident 
Coordinator 2012). 
It took up to five days for the flood water to recede. The 
government and Fiji Red Cross (amongst other teams) 
assessed the damage and started co-ordinating and 
providing relief across the identified priority cluster 
areas. According to the humanitarian action plan by 
the UN Resident Coordinator (2012), electricity was 
restored and water was partly restored 10 days after 
the flood. Initial assessments made on the cost of 
sustained damages to key economic sectors amounted 
to more than F$71 million, and yet little assistance 
was provided to economic sectors (such as local 
commercial businesses) to recover from the disaster. 
Not only did local businesses indicate that there was 
an inadequate level of warning of the impending flood, 
the damage bills were high and the recovery and 
assistance from local authorities was lack-luster. 
These experiences do little but instill fear of future 
flooding events in communities. 
All survey respondents indicated they were concerned 
about the possibility of another flood in Nadi. In 
particular, 49 per cent of respondents were ‘extremely’ 
concerned, 39 per cent were ‘very’ concerned, six per 
cent were ‘moderately’ concerned, and only six per cent 
were ‘a little’ concerned. As put succinctly by a male 
shop owner: ‘We are very concerned unless precautionary 
measures are put in place’ (survey #8).
Precautionary measures
Of the 34 businesses surveyed, only eight had 
insurance (24 per cent). These eight businesses 
included the large department stores, car dealership, 
major supermarket and two of the telecommunication 
shops. According to UNDP (2007, p. 80), ‘Insurance can 
play an important role in enabling people to manage 
climate risks without having to reduce consumption 
or run down their assets’. For local businesses in 
Nadi, it is difficult and extremely costly to obtain 
insurance. Local insurance companies refuse to insure 
businesses in Nadi due to the high flooding risk. This 
leaves businesses with only one option of securing 
insurance—through international companies, which can 
be costly. As one female shop owner explained: ‘Since 
we don’t get insurance policies locally and international 
ones are very expensive, I have a bank account in which I 
save F$50 a week for any disasters that may come’ (survey 
#22). This difficult situation, where smaller local 
businesses do not have insurance could be improved 
by, as one male shop owner recommended: ‘I believe we 
should have a flood insurance system’ (survey #15).
According to the United Nations Human Development 
Report of 2007-2008 there are a number of ‘factors that 
create a predisposition for the conversion of risk into 
vulnerability’ (UNDP 2007, p. 79). Among those, ‘limited 
access to insurance’ plays a central role in increasing 
Local businesses without insurance found it hard to recover quickly or had to close down.
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we don’t get insurance policies locally and international 
ones are very expensive, I have a bank account in which I 
save F$50 a week for any disasters that may come’ (survey 
#22). This difficult situation, where smaller local 
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by, as one male shop owner recommended: ‘I believe we 
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Local businesses without insurance found it hard to recover quickly or had to close down.
vulnerability (UNDP 2007, p. 80). In terms of individual 
households and small business proprietors, insurance 
plays an important role in managing climate risk by 
enabling crucial assets to be protected. Without such 
protection (as is the case for the majority of Nadi small 
local businesses surveyed), proprietors are open to 
absorbing the shocks of such climate hazards without 
the necessary protection. Severe flooding, at increased 
intervals, is likely to eliminate saved capital and lead to 
businesses closing their doors if they cannot absorb 
the cost of stock, infrastructure and other 
capital losses.
Respondents were asked to reflect on their level of 
concern over a series of 20 diverse issues in their 
community, ranging from unemployment, transport 
infrastructure, governance structures, and the 
maintenance of cultural identity. The purpose of this 
question was to compare how respondents viewed a 
series of important community issues and to ascertain 
whether localised flooding was a core concern. This 
level of concern was assessed using a Likert scale 
of 0 (‘no concern’) to 4 (‘extreme level of concern’). 
The issue that showed the highest level of concern 
by respondents was high crime levels (mean=3.3) 
and the frequency and severity of floods (mean=3.3), 
followed closely by the low-lying nature of Nadi itself 
(mean=3.2). Crime and looting were reported in the 
media and referred to by respondents as a serious 
problem during the 2012 flood. These findings indicate 
how the three major concerns for respondents all 
relate to the disastrous impacts of localised flooding 
events on the Nadi community and surrounding areas.
Another prominent issue of paramount concern for 
respondents (gauged in a seperate question) was 
that the Fiji Government should pay more attention to 
natural disasters such as floods when making planning 
decisions (mean=3.5). Some survey respondents 
explained how and why the government needed to 
seriously consider how it manages disasters, such as 
floods, in the future. For one male shop owner:
‘I feel for the sake of livelihood in Nadi, the government 
should divert the Nadi river to avoid any more disasters 
as the people of Nadi has suffered a lot in the past due 
to flood. This is the best option and the government 
must take keen interest in protecting jobs, safety and 
security of not only businesses in Nadi but also the 
general public’ (survey #10).
Expectation was clearly placed on the Fiji Government 
to address and manage disaster preparedness 
(including more effective warning systems) and 
recovery for local businesses. A large proportion of 
respondents voiced their support for the Nadi River to 
be diverted. This is also a mainstream and widespread 
request from the broader local community.
While it seems like an unreasonable and even 
unrealistic request, it is something that has been 
seriously considered by authorities but no clear plan 
for the future has been executed. The Nadi Town 
council and officials from the Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency have carefully considered a river 
re-divert plan as a way of providing a solution to Nadi’s 
flooding problems. It is likely that the main impediment 
to its implementation is finances. Diverting the Nadi 
River away from the town centre and the majority of 
the population, via a three-kilometre diversion channel 
is estimated to cost F$62.9 million (Wise 2012). This 
funding has not yet been forthcoming. 
Not everyone agrees, however, that diverting the river 
or dredging the mouth of the river is the best approach 
to mitigate the threat of such flooding events in the 
Nadi area. An eight and a half kilometre stretch of the 
Nadi River was dredged following the flood in January 
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2009. Despite the removal of 1.1 million cubic metres 
of silt from the river system, the dredging proved 
ineffective in preventing the flood in March 2012. Nunn 
(2010) argued that diverting the Nadi River away from 
the town centre would be ineffective in mitigating flood 
risk. Nunn (2010) claimed that sea level rise, which is 
expected to continue to increase over the next century, 
is the root cause of the increased flooding events in 
Nadi and, hence, the diversion exercise would make 
little or no difference. For Nunn (2010, p. 246), the ‘only 
realistic option for Nadi town is to relocate as soon as 
possible’. This proposed long-term adaptation strategy 
for Nadi and nearby areas to relocate to higher ground 
brings with it a host of concerns about rights to land 
and culture (Farbotko & Lazrus 2012), and a complex 
set of socio-economic and psycho-social community 
impacts (McNamara & Westoby 2011) that require 
careful and sensitive consideration.
Lessons and conclusions
Across the Pacific region, communities are faced with 
a series of challenges—economic uncertainty, socio-
cultural change, and natural resource management. 
Climate change and the severity of natural disasters 
are a major threat to the sustainability of Pacific 
populations, both in the short and long-term. 
Adaptation to hazards is likely to be exacerbated by 
sea-level rise, which is a critical issue for all Pacific 
Island countries. As appropriate and sustainable 
strategies are developed by governments and civil 
society organisations across the region to respond 
to climate change and climate-induced events in the 
future, it is crucial that we learn how past disasters 
have been experienced and managed. This event in Fiji 
exemplifies the complexity of longer-term planning, 
particularly as it appears that local communities 
are becoming more reliant on others to assist in 
developing solutions.
The flood in March 2012 was considered by the media 
and Fiji Government officials as the worst flooding 
event experienced by Fiji in decades. Based on a 
survey of 34 local businesses in Nadi, six months after 
the flood, their experience was epitomised by this 
male shop manager: ‘This last flood was the biggest 
and we couldn’t help each other’ (survey #15). The 
experiences of local businesses with this flood have 
highlighted a number of shortcomings and subsequent 
recommendations for the future. Little warning, high 
recovery costs, poor levels of assistance from the 
government to help businesses prepare and recover, 
and limited insurance were all serious factors that 
undermined the capacity of businesses to cope with the 
disaster. Many respondents ‘live in fear’ (survey #2) that 
another flood will cause further devastation and force 
more local businesses to close down their operations. 
Disaster risk reduction and management is a multi-
disciplinary and cross-sectoral issue. As such, it 
should not only be mainstreamed at the national level, 
but be a national and local priority. Respondents made 
it clear that the government—across all levels—needs 
to provide greater attention to disasters when making 
planning decisions for the Nadi area. At the national 
level, work should continue through the National 
Disaster Management Office which co-ordinates 
emergencies such as this one, on improving early 
warning systems and disaster preparedness and, if 
necessary, improved flood forecasting. There was 
a clear deficiency in the warnings provided to local 
businesses, and indeed the community at large, prior 
to this flooding event. Another approach that could be 
explored by local government is the re-planting of the 
forests upstream, which have been cleared extensively 
in the past and are, in part, responsible for the rapid 
rate at which rainwater drains into the lowlands. Such 
re-vegetation initiatives could reduce the velocity of 
floodwaters, delay the flooding of towns, and increase 
the warning time provided to local communities 
to prepare.
Nadi Town becomes a flurry of activity a week after the flood with numerous local businesses holding ‘flood sales’.
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Flooding events are common in Fiji. However, the 
incidence of such events, particularly in the Western 
Division, has also increased in ‘magnitude and duration 
over the past five years’ (Nunn 2010, p. 245). This 
presents a significant challenge to the long-term 
sustainable development of the country, especially 
in high-risk locations such as Nadi, which is home 
to the core pillars of the Fijian economy. In facing 
these challenges, there is an urgent need to explore 
lessons learned from past events and develop further 
strategies to mitigate the threat of floods. Some 
lessons have been briefly explored in this article and 
have revolved around the need for more effective 
early warning systems and dissemination of accurate 
information to people, greater external assistance to 
local businesses to help in the recovery stage, and 
better long-term planning decisions around land-
use and catchment management. Respondents also 
reflected on their fear of future flooding events and 
the hardships they face as a result of being unable to 
insure their business. It is hoped that such lessons 
can also value-add to current discussions surrounding 
disaster risk management and climate change (see 
Gero, Méheux & Dominey-Howes 2010; Mercer 2010). 
At present, these discussions are very prominent at the 
regional level in the Pacific, with a process underway 
to develop an integrated Pacific regional strategy 
for disaster risk management and climate change 
adaptation and mitigation for 2016-2025. It is hoped that 
such an integrated strategy will be beneficial to how 
local communities and businesses prepare and recover 
from disasters in the future.
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